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ABSTRACT 
The prevention of parallel importation means that a firm which establishes a 
foothold in a market in respect of a particular product can prevent others from 
importing the same product. 
This paper considers some of the reasons raised by those who seek to limit 
import competition, which are characterised by self-interest and the raising of 
potentially spurious arguments to justify their position against the global 
background trend of freeing up markets and exposing traders to the discipline 
posed by competition. 
The possible economic and, to a lesser extent, social consequences upon a market 
are then analysed, with the conclusion being reached that the degree of any 
adverse impact upon an economy will be a function of such matters as the extent 
of vertical integration, power to segment markets and differentiation of products. 
It is observed that any ban upon parallel importations is effectively setting up a 
vertical restriction and establishes the factors necessary for price discrimination. 
Finally, it considers the extent to which copyright and trade mark rights can be 
used as a barrier to import competition and establishes that, notwithstanding the 
potential for inefficiencies and consumer welfare losses, copyright law does give 
the holder of copyright an impermeable barrier to prevent parallel importation. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 15,590 words. 
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PARALLEL IMPORTS: TIME TO ATTACK THE 
CITADEL? 
I INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade or so, New Zealand has made a massive shift in its 
international trade policy; it has taken the hard decisions to dismantle tariff and 
subsidy protection of its domestic industries in order to make them internationally 
competitive and to meet concerns from its trading partners, which argued that 
state support of industry was not appropriate. At the same time, there has been 
an increasing focus on globalisation, on regarding the world as an open market 
with a removal of barriers to cross-border trade, which has seen the development 
of "free trading" areas, within which territorial borders become virtually invisible. 
Intellectual property rights, however, seem to be a special case. As with all 
signatories to the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs, New Zealand needed to audit its intellectual property legislation to ensure 
compliance with the newly reached Trade Related Aspects of International 
Property agreement. That provided an ideal opportunity to consider the type of 
intellectual property rights available and to harmonise them with the trade policy. 
It might have been expected that any provisions which had the effect of hindering 
the access of imports to the New Zealand market would be removed yet, if 
anything, the rules were tightened by the amendments made in 1994 to the New 
Zealand legislation. 
I do not intended in this paper to debate the merits of intellectual property 
protection as such: quite plainly there are strong arguments founded upon 
economic principles as well as principles of natural justice and the basic notion 
that society should provide a reward for labour which justify the legal protection 
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of the bundle of rights for which the shorthand term is intellectual property. I do, 
however, wish to develop a comment made by Hammond (now Hammond J): 
the [economic] model is increasingly being asked to 
accommodate more than it was designed for, and probably far 
more than it can ever satisfactorily accommodate. More and 
more people are trying to accommodate more and more things 
under the protective umbrella of intellectual property law to 
achieve private economic gain" 1 
Intellectual property rights seem to have become regarded as some sort of citadel 
with holy significance which no Government dare touch. One aspect of these 
rights is the prohibition in New Zealand law against parallel imports. Two simple 
cases illustrate the possible benefits arising from import competition. 
The first is where the authorised exclusive Australian distributor of a cookbook 
imported from the United States, was selling it for $16.95. A bookseller 
imported its own supplies from a wholesaler in California and started selling for 
$8.95.2 The second is taken from the New Zealand context, where nobody will 
have failed to notice the drastic reduction in car prices following the flood of 
used car imports, primarily from Japan, which has resulted in new car price 
reductions in order to "meet the market". Curiously, this practice has gone on 
unchecked for several years, although at least two firms have indicated they will 
take action to prevent further imports. Already, interim injunctions have been 
granted on a similar basis to prevent the importation of Rossignol skis, Kawasaki 
jetskis and Smith & Wesson firearms. 
1 Hammond, G The Legal Protection of Ideas (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall LJ 93, 95 
2 Time-Life International (Nederlands) BV v Interstate Parcel Express Co Pty Ltd & Anor 
(1976) 12 ALR I; on appeal to High Court Interstate Parcel Express Co Pty Ltd v Time-
Life International (Nederlands) BV & Anor (1977) 15 ALR 353. The authorised 
distributor was able to use the Australian copyright legislation to prevent this 
"unauthorised" import competition. 
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Surely, if this kind of importation leads to lower prices, that is a good thing and 
should be encouraged rather than prohibited? Unfortunately, as my analysis in 
the first part of this paper demonstrates, it is not that simple. I then consider the 
effect of intellectual property rights on importation and whether they account for 
any of the economic concerns arising from prohibition. 
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II WHAT IS A "PARALLEL IMPORT" 
Parallel importation implies a firm operating in one country (for example, the 
United States) which has set up some form of distribution channel into another 
(New Zealand). Most simply, parallel importation occurs where an established 
New Zealand importer is bypassed, and product obtained directly from some 
overseas market.3 
This is not in itself unlawful; for example, the fact that two importers are bringing 
bulk rice into New Zealand from the same source means they are importing in 
parallel with each other but no legal consequences will spring from that fact. 
The goods may, however, be cloaked with some form of intellectual property 
protection; the rice may be packaged and imported bearing a trade mark or in 
copyright packaging to differentiate it from rice sold by another firm. 
Alternatively, the goods may be subject to copyright protection in their own 
right; they may be books, music, vehicles, pin ball machines or bottles of alcohol, 
to give just a few examples of the type of goods which may be imported. 
The New Zealand distributor of such products, having invested in an exclusive 
arrangement with the primary right holder and in marketing the goods in the New 
Zealand market, is going to see its investment undermined if it then faces 
competition from another importer of the same product, and will attempt to erect 
legal barriers to restrain the activities of the other. 
The concern of this paper is the protection afforded by copyright and trademarks 
to this distributor, assuming that it has become entitled to exercise the rights 
arising under copyright or trade mark. There are other mechanisms available 
3 The product must be legitimately for sa le in that country, it may be the United States (used in 
this example as the source of the product) or some other coun try to which the primary 
right holder exports (Singapore, for example). 
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which may also be used to prevent imports, such as passing off, a "fair trading" 
remedy,4 patents5 or possibly the agreement between a New Zealand importer 
and the source of products6 
A "parallel importer" is thus an importer which obtains goods from some foreign 
source without any authorisation from the domestic right holder, brings them into 
the country and sets up in competition with the domestic marketing channel. 
Importantly, the goods must be legitimately for sale in the country from which 
they are imported; my concern here is not with the importation of counterfeit 
goods. 
4 Section 9 Fair Trading Act 1986 (New Zealand), for example, states "No person shall, in 
trade, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or 
deceive." 
5 The question of patents and parallel importation will not be considered in this paper. In very 
general terms, a buyer of such goods is seen to have some form of implied licence to 
use, sell and import the goods, so patent goods do not throw up the same policy 
considerations and the analysis of situations where the buyer is not seen to have such 
an implied licence would largely be a matter of construction of agreements or conduct 
which in some way abrogated the importation rights. The rationale is that the patent 
holder is granted an exclusive right to make, sell and use an invention. The sale of a 
patent good by necessary implication gives the buyer the right to use and resell, unless 
negatived, as held in the early case of Thomas A Edison Ltd v Stockdale [1919) NZLR 
276, where the plaintiff held patent rights to phonographs and records and printed a 
very restrictive license to purchasers and users of those records. Herdman J referred to 
National Phonograph Co v Menck [ 19 I 1] AC 336 (PC) where it was held that there 
was a presumption in favour of the right of "full ownership" (including "the absolute 
freedom of disposal of chattels" (page 349) being vested in the purchaser but this could 
be made subject to restrictive conditions, as here. 
6 The authorised importer may have been appointed as some sort of exclusive reseller; this will 
not generally give it any rights against the parallel importer but there will generally be 
contractual rights against the foreign right holder. 
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II WHY DOES IT OCCUR? 
The obvious reason is that someone sees an opportunity to land goods in New 
Zealand cheaper or quicker from a foreign source than by buying through the 
local authorised distributor. This can arise from a number of factors: 
1. The sensitivity to price changes of a particular good7 will vary from market to 
market. As a result, where there is a high level of sensitivity to price changes, 
the price will tend to be lower8 than in markets where there is less sensitivity, 
which implies that consumers are more willing to purchase despite price 
increases9. A profit maximising primary right holder would be expected to 
vary the price from market to market 10 according to price sensitivity and 
utility. This provides for an arbitrage opportunity; goods can be purchased in 
the country in which they are relatively cheap, imported into a country where 
they are relatively expensive and sold in competition with the authorised 
distributor; 
2. Marketing strategies may vary from country to country; the primary right 
holder may not invest in marketing in one country but instead allow for a 
relatively high margin to be earned by the authorised importer, thereby 
encouraging that importer to invest in marketing whereas in another country, 
the marketing role may be taken on by the primary right holder and reduce 
the margin by charging a high wholesale price. An importer could avoid that 
by obtaining goods from a high margin/low investment country; 
3. The goods may be subject to niche marketing in particular countries; certain 
brands of vehicle, for example, have a somewhat exclusive image in New 
Zealand, induced partly by a high price tag whereas the same vehicles in their 
7 i.e. Price ela ticity. Numerous elements, including the standard of living, possibility of 
substitutes , taste and the nature of the good will determine the price elasticity and 
explain differences from market to market. 
8 Because, as prices increase, there will be a relatively rapid fall off in demand. 
9 More accurately, demand diminishes at a relatively slow rate as price changes. 
10 Price discrimination. 
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country of origin they may have a much more humble status and be priced 
accordingly; 
4. Market conditions will vary from country to country, which might also allow 
an arbitrage opportunity. Goods made in a country where the manufacturer 
can take advantage of economies of scale, lower labour and capital costs can 
be obtained cheaper than the same goods made in a country without such 
advantages. If those cheaper goods can then be brought into a market where 
the production costs are higher, the importer will have a competitive 
advantage; 
5. The quality of the goods in the foreign market may be inferior. It is debatable 
whether such a situation is truly an example of parallel importation, as the 
goods, by being of inferior quality, can be seen as differentiated from those in 
the domestic market through the authorised channel. 
6. Currency fluctuations mean that goods can temporarily be obtained overseas 
cheaper than through the authorised distributor, but these prices can not be 
taken advantage of by that distributor because it is contractually bound to 
take goods from a particular source. 11 
11 This cause may well be more significant than might be thought; Rothnie cites research in the 
United States establishing a correlation between the extent of parallel importation and 
the relative value of the United States dollar, particularly observable from 1981 when the 
dollar experienced a rapid information. The original research may be seen in Hilke, 
John C Free Trading or Free Riding: An Examination of the Theories and Available 
Empirical Evidence on Gray Market Imports ( 1988) 32 World Competition 75 
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Ill WHY Do RIGHTS HOLDERS OPPOSE PARALLEL 
IMPORTING? 
The underlying premise of parallel importation is that goods have been 
purchased, not from the domestic supplier, but from some other source 
authorised by the primary right holder. Why then is the right holder concerned? 
It still gets paid for those sales, no goods are wrongly created in this process, 
they are simply moved from one part of the world to another, so why stop it? 
Obviously, they will only do so if it is in their economic interests to do so, but 
what arguments do the rights holders raise to explain or justify their actions? 
A Parallel Importers are Parasitic Free Riders 
The traditional argument raised is that parallel importers compete unfairly, in that 
they either wait for a firm to invest in research and development and copy the 
product generated without the same levels of investment12 or, more significant in 
the present context, they take advantage of the goodwill associated with a 
particular good or firm, again without the investments in advertising, distribution, 
I . 11 I . 14 pre-sa es services · or post-sa e services . 
While this may be true of some parallel importers, it can hardly be true of all. 
Numerous objections can be raised: 
• The authorised importer is effectively being held up as the standard to which 
all should be compared, but there is no guarantee it will be any better; indeed 
basic competition theory is to the effect that if a firm is the only source from 
12 Given that there is no unauthorised creation of goods implicit in parallel importation, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to address this aspect of the debate. 
13 In other words, such matters as staff training, customer demonstrations and training. 
14 This would include warranty claims, helplines, provision of spare parts and repair facilities. 
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which services can be obtained, it has little incentive to operate at the optimal 
level but will instead operate at the level which suits it best; 
• Free-riding in this sense can only be a temporary strategy; customers would 
soon realise that the importer provided little pre or post sales support; 
• It forecloses the consumers having the choice of a lower cost, lower service 
provider; 
• It ignores the possibility that an alternative market structure, such as a 
specialist importer or distributor, which may have greater economies of scope 
or scale available to it, might be more efficient 15 than the right holder setting 
up its own distribution network 
• On a theoretical level, this free rider argument might be available to a trade 
mark holder, given the function of a trade mark 16, but there is major difficulty 
in seeing it as a legitimate justification for copyright, which is supposedly to 
reward and encourage the creation of works, not the recovery of investment 
on marketing. 
B Undermining the "orderly market" 
This is a claim that rights holders seem to like advancing without providing 
specific detail of quite what it means, so it is difficult to assess. A, perhaps 
cynical, explanation is provided by Ruff 17 
"Yet defenders of parallel importing argue that local distributors 
are simply afraid of competition. Parallel imports threaten to 
disturb authorized distributors' insulated pricing schemes. 
These schemes allow distributors to charge the highest possible 
15 I leave open at the moment precisely what is meant by "efficiency" ; it is considered in depth 
in the next section. 
16 As will be developed in a later section, the point of trade mark protection is to identify and 
distinguish the source; if the domestic source of the goods is important yet not in any 
way identified by the trade mark, then arguably the trade mark is not being used 
properly, if it really only points to the foreign source. 
17 Ruff, Andrew Releasing the Grays: /11 Support of Parallel Imports ( 1992) 11 Pacific Basin 
Law Journal I 19 
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prices in each of their foreign markets without fear of 
competition between markets." 18 
In my view, this is really a complaint that allowing import competition is going to 
undermine the efforts made by rights holders to set up price discrimination 
schemes; if each country is treated as an isolated and sealed off market, then that 
al lows the right holder to price in accordance with what that market will bear. 
The merits of this are discussed in the next section. 
C Investment in marketing will be diminished 
The claim here is that pre and post sales support will be eroded by competition, 
that choice will be restricted as the right holder will necessarily concentrate upon 
the fast selling, profitable items 19 so that consumer choice is reduced. The 
problem here is the lack of empirical evidence to determine the validity of such a 
self-serving claim but it is unlikely to hold true in all cases. An inefficient 
importer, shielded by the present ban, may need to shake off its lethargy and be 
more, not less, responsive to consumer demand in order to survive. Those 
supporting a ban seem to assume no inefficiencies will arise but there does appear 
to be room for scepticism.20 
18 Page 120. He quotes A Robertson Stevenson, Vice President of K Mart ( a firm which does 
engage in parallel importation in the United States) who sees a proposed ban as "a 
smokescreen for the fact that the distributors don't want to be price competitive".) 
19 In the context of the book market, for example, just best sellers. 
20 While there is an absence of empirical evidence for New Zealand here, there is anecdotal 
support provided in the submissions to the New Zealand Commerce Select Committee 
considering the proposed Copyright Bill 1994. Independent record sellers accused the 
large record companies of holding inadequate supplies of backlist and non-mainstream 
music and at the same time trying to stop the record sellers from, in effect, making up 
for the deficiencies in the market by importing. Naturally the record companies retorted 
by saying all records could be indented through them, so long as the requisite numbers 
were ordered, which I took as rather proving the point being made by the independents. 
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D Other Arguments 
Rights holders raise a number of other arguments in support of a ban on parallel 
importation which I do not propose to explore. Two of the more common of 
these arguments21 is that it is necessary because of the prevalence of piracy,22 and 
that it is the "right" of an owner of intellectual property to prevent imports.23 
D Foreign Trade Implications 
Brown24 notes that, in the context of a New Zealand Governmental analysis of 
the ban on parallel imports conducted in 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade submitted that a removal would seriously change New Zealand's trade 
relations with the United States, which wanted the ban maintained. A submission 
by the America New Zealand Chamber of Commerce to the Commerce 
Committee was to similar effect. 
The fear is that there might be American retaliation, in the form of import 
restrictions on New Zealand products if United States' rights holders do not have 
their exports to New Zealand protected from import competition. This would 
certainly not be the first time America has shown a willingness to punish those 
countries which do not conform to its pattern of doing business. As Ullrich25 
21 My source here is the submissions made in the context of New Zealand's proposed Copyright 
Bill 1994; a number of submissions made to the Commerce Committee raised this 
concern. 
22 The making of copies unlawfully is indeed a significant problem and one which clearly 
justifies some right on the part of rights holders to prevent. One argument put is that if 
rights holders have total control over all imports, then only those imports which they 
have authorised will come into the market. Because of the quality of pirated copies, 
some are indistinguishable from goods sold legitimately overseas, so, as the argument 
goes, all imports should be prohibited except by the domestic rights holders. The merits 
of this argument probably justify a paper devoted to the issue. 
23 This, obviously, begs the question of why there needs to be such a right. 
24 Brown, Andrew New Zealand's Copyright Act of I 994 ( 1995) 9 IPJ 229 
25 Ullrich, Hans GA IT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development in Beier, 
Friedrich-Karl & Schricker, Gerhard (Eds) GAIT or WIPO? New Ways in the 
International Protection of Intellectual Property 1988 Max Planck Institute for Foreign 
and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich at pages 149-150 
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shows, President Reagan, concerned that America was losing its competitive 
edge because of relatively high labour costs, saw intellectual property rights as 
one way to protect itself from a decreased competitiveness. 
E International Treaty Obligations 
New Zealand is a signatory to the Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS); an agreement which has patently conflicting objectives. The 
tension is obvious from the opening statement of the Agreement: 
"Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international 
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and 
adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure 
that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property 
rights do not themselves barriers to legitimate trade ... " 
The problem is the lack of any clear identification of what is to constitute 
legitimate trade. In particular, nowhere is it clearly stated whether parallel 
importation is a form of legitimate trade. The closely-related doctrine of 
international exhaustion has been carefully stipulated as not addressed by TRIPS, 
in Article 6. As Katzenberger26 points out: 
"The important and internationally intensely disputed problem of 
exhaustion ... which otherwise is not touched upon in the TRIPs 
Agreement, is thus removed from the TRIPs dispute settlement 
mechanism, so that it is basically left to each TRIPs member to 
decide ... " 
citing a Memorandum of President Reagan of 21 July 1988 where, because Brazil is 
perceived as providing inadequate intellectual property protection for United States' 
pharmaceuticals, he instructed officials to identify appropriate Brazilian products on 
which to increase import duties or other import restrictions. 
26 Katzenberger, Paul TR!Ps and Copyright LLlw in Beier, Friedrich-Karl & Schricker, Gerhard 
(Eds) From GA TT to TR!Ps - The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 1996 Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, 
Copyright and Competition Law, Munich at pages 80-81 
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for itself the extent to which exhaustion applies, and as a corollary, the extent to 
which parallel importation is to be restricted, in domestic law. 
Ullrich27 sees TRIPs as expressly refraining from regulating problems such as "the 
gray market of parallel imports". Although Straus28 saw the freedom of members 
to apply the doctrine of exhaustion as undermining the guarantee contained in 
Article 28 of the territorial right to a patent29, he is implicitly confirming the view 
that TRIPs does not oblige its signatories to prohibit parallel importation. 
Certainly there was no suggestion in any of the submissions to the Commerce 
Committee nor in the Departmental Report30, when deciding whether to ban 
parallel importation in the Copyright Act 1994, that there was any international 
obligation to do so. 
27 Ullrich, Hans Technology Protection According to TRIPs: Principles and Problems in Beier, 
Friedrich-Karl & Schricker, Gerhard (Eds) From CATT to TRIPs - The Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1996 Max Planck Institute for 
Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich at page 359 
28 Straus, Joseph Impact of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law in Beier, Friedrich-
Karl & Schricker, Gerhard (Eds) From CATT to TRIPs - The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1996 Max Planck Institute for Foreign 
and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich at page 194 
29 He gave the example of goods patented in India (where prevailing market conditions meant 
goods had to be supplied cheaply) and in Japan - the Japanese patent would become 
virtually worthless if it applied the doctrine of exhaustion, because goods could be 
imported from India into Japan, against which the Japanese patentee could not compete. 
30 Department of Justice Departmental Report on Copyright Bill to Commerce Select 
Committee 3 November 1994 
IV CONSEQUENCES 
IMPORTATION? 
15 
OF BANNING PARALLEL 
The arguments raised by rights holders31 against relaxation of bans can be 
characterised as lacking in hard evidence or even any rigorous examination into 
the social and economic consequences of such a ban. Unfortunately, and this is 
more than likely a function of the economic significance of intellectual property, 
the approach taken when considering a lifting of the ban32 is to require a 
justification for the lifting. Why not require those seeking the ban to show a clear 
justification which outweighs any potential social or economic harm? 
In this section, I will consider some of the implications arising within a market 
where imports are restricted to just those importers who have been authorised by 
the right holder. 33 
A The Concept of Product Differentiation 
If parallel importation is banned, the most fundamental consequence is that there 
is restriction on access to the "world price"34 of the particular goods; they can 
only come on to the domestic market through channels authorised by the primary 
right holder. Whether this gives rise to concern will generally be a function of the 
goods involved, in particular a function of how successful the right holder has 
been in differentiating its products from similar products sold by other firms. 
31 The fact that it is the rights holders who raise this argument is in itself grounds for suspicion. 
32 As in New Zealand in 1994. 
33 It will be assumed that the law gives either the right holder or its authorised importer the 
right to prevent anyone else importing the same goods and selling them in competition 
with the authorised importer 
34 That is the price which would be hypothetically available if the world is an open market. For 
present purposes, I will be using the lowest price at which goods can be obtained from 
any source as being an approximation of this world price. A more theoretical approach 
would be to compare the price of the goods with the marginal costs of production, with 
any excess being characterised as supranormal profits. 
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Rice can be used as emblematic of an undifferentiated product; if an importer of 
bulk unbranded rice seeks to raise prices above the world price, it is unlikely that 
it could maintain that position as a competing importer would simply obtain rice 
from another source and so the domestic price is going to approximate the world 
price. The key here is that there is no differentiation between the products from 
the various suppliers. So long as there is easy substitution between goods, then 
each seller has no influence over its sale price; basically if prices are raised above 
the norm, the seller makes no sales .35 
Even if the rice is packaged and branded36, this is likely to only be a weak form of 
differentiation; it is probable that inter-brand substitution is likely; so that a 
particular brand will become price sensitive. The consequence of this is that if a 
particular brand of rice (brand X) is being sold in New Zealand at a margin above 
the world price for Brand X, even if an importer is prevented from getting Brand 
X at the world price and bringing it in to compete, the importer will be able to 
bring in a competing brand, (brand Y) confident that consumers will not cling 
irrationally to Brand X but will substitute to Brand Y.37 
This can only apply to goods where either there is no clear differentiation 
between goods from different suppliers (such as unbranded rice) or where there 
is, consumers are not concerned with source. If there was a multiplicity of 
suppliers of these items or there were ready substitutes (inter-brand competition), 
a supplier which tried to increase price or reduce service would lose a sale to 
competing firms or products but a supplier of a good which has no close 
35 A further example of this appears to be the personal computer market, where there is little 
evidence of substantial differences between New Zealand prices and prices in other 
countries, because there is little to differentiate computers of different brands and buyers 
are willing to substitute brands. Individual firms, even the largest, are thereby 
constrained by the competition to sell at the best possible price and provide the best 
possible service if they wish to retain a foothold in the market. 
36 Branding, or course, is not the only way in which a product is differentiated. As it is the 
branding which is one source or legal protection against import competition, I am using 
a simplifying assumption that the brand is what differentiates one supplier's product 
form an otherwise identical product of another. 
37 Even with rice, there is some potential for a brand to attract a premium in a particular market 
(some will buy Big Ben but not Sunwhite) but as rice is such a utilitarian product, this 
cannot be true or many people. 
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substitute and where there is no competing supplier has a certain degree of 
freedom to engage in such conduct. 
It is this willingness to substitute between brands of essentially the same product 
which provides the key to measuring the possible harm flowing from banning 
parallel imports. If there is no inter-brand competition and only one source, so 
there can be no intra-brand competition, that is a position which can be exploited 
by the primary right holder, the authorised importer or both. 
It is unlikely that any goods fall completely into a class of goods where no-one 
will substitute between brands, but some types of goods have a high degree of 
"brand loyalty" - such as perfumes, vehicles and cameras, at least at the 
"exclusive" end of the market. Taste will dictate that buyers of books, music, 
perfumes, motor vehicles and many other goods choose a good of a particular 
brand and characteristics; a buyer of a BMW may well not regard a Mercedes as 
a clear substitute or a buyer of Jane Austen's Persuasion may not be content with 
Henry Fielding's Moll Flanders and be even Jess content with Grisham's The 
Firm38 and not at all content with Borrowdale's Commercial Law in New 
Zealand39. 
Goods such as movies, books and music can also be seen as a subset; it is not so 
much the brand which attracts a Joyal following as the individual product within 
the line; those consumers wishing to buy the Spice Girls album are not going to 
see any other album as a perfect substitute; if there is only one domestic source of 
Spice Girls albums, the supplier has the potential to price accordingly, as there 
are no competitive constraints. (Actually, spice girls may not be a very good 
example - the lack of competition is at wholesale/import level - the buyers (the 
retail outlets) will not be buying in accordance with their individual taste and 
38 Of course, for buyers of Persuasion, as the text no longer has copyright protection, there is 
import competition from other publishers but this will not be the case with The Firm. 
39 This is not to suggest any criticism of that text; the point is that buyers of classic fiction are 
unlikely to see a Commercial Law text as a substitute despite the fact that both are 
books. 
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there is competition at the retail level, which minimises the ability to raise prices 
for that particular product). 
New Zealand has recently witnessed the benefits of unrestrained parallel imports 
in the second hand motor vehicle market, which brought the prices of second 
hand cars down dramatically40 which has had a flow on effect into the new car 
market. Apart from some evidence of odometer winding, there has been little 
evidence of the dire outcomes predicted by rights holders; indeed, the variety of 
new cars available in New Zealand and services (such as financing arrangements) 
has done nothing but increase, as firms have to be more vigorous in their 
marketing practices to stay afloat41 • 
The point being made is that without the degree of influence of the right holder 
becoming sufficiently significant as to attract the operation of section 36 
Commerce Act 1986-12, an importer will some degree of market power, to the 
extent that its goods have no perfect substitute, without running foul of the 
Commerce Act 1986.43 It reaches this degree of market power by promoting its 
product, using intellectual property rights such as trade marks to do so. The 
irony is that it is this very investment in differentiating the product which is seized 
upon by the importer as justifying exclusive rights to import. In my view, it is no 
answer to say that this is a failure of competition law, because that does not deal 
with the issue of why there is statutory protection in the first place. 
40 Estimates of savings of around 30% are quite common. 
41 Interestingly, the Dominion newspaper of Saturday 20 September reports that Toyota New 
Zealand Ltd is presently seeking to register its trade mark in New Zealand and to put a 
stop to parallel importation of used Toyota vehicles into the country, possibly to 
minimise competition with its own operation . 
42 Which , given current interpretations, does actually allow for significant market power to 
accrue before it becomes operative. 
43 A situation commonly called monopolistic competition . 
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B Price Discrimination 
The idea behind price discrimination is that the sale price varies from buyer to 
buyer. In the present context, each "buyer" is in fact a market - a multinational 
finn may adapt different price levels to the various countries it supplies; when 
those price differences are not explained by associated costs, then the seller is 
said to be engaging in price discrimination. 
Three conditions are necessary for it to occur44 : 
1 . The seller has control over price; 
2. The seller can segregate its customers into groups with different pnce 
elasticities of demand; 
3. Any opportunities for arbitrage - resale by high price customers to low price 
customers must be constrained. 
The outstanding feature of these ingredients is that they are the very elements a 
firm is given by a prohibition against parallel imports; if such imports are 
prevented, then it gives control over to sellers over prices (assuming there are no 
perfect substitutes), it creates a territorial segregation and prevents arbitraging. 
Thus, a firm campaigning for a ban on parallel imports is implicitly campaigning 
for the right to discriminate, as the very prohibition seems made to measure to 
allow for price discrimination, particularly second degree discrimination45 . This is 
described as a cruder version of first degree discrimination, under which: 
each unit is sold at its reservation price, so that every 
customer is milked of the largest outlay he or she would be 
44 Scherer, FM & Ross, David Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 1990 
3rd Edition Houghton Mifflin Company - page 489 
45 The se ller segregates buyers into blocks (countries) and makes an assumption as to the price 
at which it can maximise profits (generall y, the reservation price) within the particular 
block; it will sell to all countries where the sale price exceeds marginal costs. Markets 
where competition is weak will be paying a higher price than where it is strong 
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willing to commit for the good in question and still consider its 
purchase worthwhile."46 
As Scherer & Ross point out, this causes a redistribution of income away from 
the consumer to the seller; a rational firm is only going to do so if it is in its own 
interest. Whether this is acceptable, as they acknowledge, is a matter for a value 
judgrnent but where the redistribution is to an external economy, it has adverse 
implications for the domestic economy. They do go on to point out that a second 
degree discriminator is generally more efficient than a simple monopoly47, but in 
the present context, the comparison is between such a discriminator and a more 
competitive market: 
"Price discrimination is a two-edged sword. It can improve the 
performance of industries that are unavoidably monopolistic, but 
it can also alter the extent of monopoly power wielded by 
sellers."48 
They identify two pro-competitive effects ansmg from unsystemic price 
discrimination, as it allows experimental pricing49 and can undermine oligopolistic 
discipline. 50 
Systemic price discrimination51 however weakens competition, as it can allow for 
firms to be entrenched in a position of power as it raises barriers to entry52, or 
46 Scherer & Ross, page 490, emphasis added. 
47 Because it encourages extra production, an increase in allocative efficiency. Even in the 
present context, there can be advantages to an economy from econd degree 
discrimination; a firm obliged to set one price will necessarily set a price to recover 
costs, so the price may have to be set too high to allow entry into particular markets. In 
other words, it can set a higher price for some markets which effectively subsidise 
products sold into markets where the "full cost recovery" price would not be sustainable. 
48 Scherer & Ross, page 499 
49 in that it allows for selective price changes to measure elasticity 
50 Oligopolistic discipline seems to include such matters as tacit collusion, which can have 
anticompetitive effects. Price discrimination would allow for secret discounts, so that 
there is cheating on the oligopoly profit maximising, meaning the discipline breaks 
down and every firm maximises its own profit, not that of the oligopoly as a whole. 
51 The meaning of which is not explained but seems to imply a policy of deliberate price 
discrimination to serve the firm's own interests. 
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provides the means to charge lower prices (in the form of cross-subsidisation or 
predatory pricing) only where competition means it has to, so that in areas of 
contestability, it is difficult for rivals to take them on.53 
Legislative responses vary; for example, it is unlawful in the US to charge 
different prices for the same goods if the effect is to substantially lessen 
competition or create a monopoly54 and Australia has a similar provision55 . New 
Zealand, reflecting the less detailed approach to defining unlawful trade practices 
has no such specific provision but, as the Court has made clear, allegations of 
price discrimination can be entertained under either section 27 or 36 Commerce 
Act J 986 if there are anti-competitive consequences. 56 
C Deadweight Losses 
Within the market, consumers will place different valuations upon the product -
all who see it has having less value than the price at which it is sold will not 
purchase it, whereas all who value it at or above the sale price can be expected to 
purchase it. If the price is increased from $10 to $20, all of those potential 
consumers with a reservation price of between $ 10 and $20 will no longer 
purchase it; this choking off of demand is a deadweight loss, and generally 
regarded as inefficient because production which could be had given existing 
resources is lost. 
If a firm is given power to set prices according to its own profit maximisation 
desire without constraint from pe1fect substitutes, a situation which a ban on 
parallel imports seems geared to allow, then there will be these dead weight losses 
52 Scherer and Ross (page 500) give the example where a dominant tin can-making firm could 
use its size to extract discounts from suppliers and gave discounts to large canneries; 
smaller tin can-making firms were therefore at a disadvantage. 
53 An issue arising in Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd ( 1995) 5 NZBLC I 03,762 
54 Robinson-Patman Acts 2 ( 1936) 
55 Trade Practices Act 1974 s 49 
56 Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd (1995) 5 NZBLC 103,762, upheld on appeal in 
Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission [ 1996] 3 NZLR 554 
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in the form of consumers willing to buy the particular product but for whom the 
price is too high. It is in this context that the "services" provided by a right 
holder become a concern; they may be over-priced, inefficient or just not wanted 
by a consumer but the consumer is faced with a situation of taking the bundle of 
goods and associated services or not, with no intermediate position of taking 
unbundled goods and making its own arrangements for services.57 
1 Consumer Welfare Transfers 
While consumer welfare transfers are regarded as transfers of income from 
consumer to producer and not necessarily inefficient, where the producer is based 
outside New Zealand, it is basically a transfer of wealth away from New Zealand. 
This arises because when goods are sold at, for example, $10, there are going to 
be consumers willing to pay more than that, in accordance with their individual 
reservation price.58 
This difference between what the consumer is willing to pay and the sale price of 
goods is described as retained wealth or "consumer surplus". If the price is 
raised, this surplus, rather than disappear, is partially transferred to the producer 
and becomes producer surplus. It can thus be seen that if consumer surplus is 
minimised by the pricing strategies of a foreign fom, that is not for the benefit of 
either the consumer or the New Zealand economy. 
57 An extremely good example of this, although not in the parallel importation context, can be 
seen in the retailing of financial products, such as unit trusts. Until recently, the 
consumer has had to pay the 5% "brokerage" to compensate the supplier of the product, 
irrespective of whether the consumer has approached a broker or the firm itself, and 
irrespective of whether the consumer has wanted advice on the product or not. Some 
brokers have recognised that not all consumers require the same level of service and so 
there has been an outcrop of "No-fee" brokers, for those who do not want the service 
component. 
58 This will be a function of the utility of the good to the individual consumer - some will value 
it so highly they will continue to buy even at $100. 
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D Relationship Between Right Holder and Importer 
In a sense, when there is only one entry point into a market for a particular good, 
a bilateral monopoly
59 
is created; a single seller (implied by the very existence of 
an intellectual property right) dealing with a single buyer (the exclusive importer). 
This will not always be a concern; the importer may be one of a number of firms 
importing goods of the general nature, so at this level competition could be 
expected; the foreign rights holder will be competing against other rights holders 
to gain access to the distribution channel into a market and the importers within 
the market will be competing with each other to obtain rights to obtain and 
supply the goods. 
As a result, the threat of loss of distributorship can pose a constraint and ensure 
competitive behaviour. Furthermore, in this arrangement, while the behaviour to 
be expected is that there will be co-operation between buyer and seller so that 
both maximise profits. As Scherer and Ross point out, this can actually be of 
benefit to consumers; the authors demonstrate60 that so long as there is co-
operation between the two (as opposed to one firm setting the price on a "take it 
or leave it basis"), the profit maximising strategy for both is to increase output, 
and it is a basic principle in economic theory that to sell a greater number of 
goods, price needs to be reduced61 
Where this will not be true is where the importer is a subsidiary of the rights 
holder, raising the potential for the problems inherent in a vertically integrated 
59 This situation may well not be regarded as a monopoly under competition law nor by 
economists who insist upon defining the market, then considering the degree of market 
power held by a firm within that market. In the present context, I am using monopoly to 
imply a situation of an exclusive right to sell a particular product; the consequences of 
this will generally be dictated by the extent to which a particular product is differentiated 
by other, similar, products so that they are not perfect substitutes. The greater the 
imperfection of the substitute, the stronger the monopoly . 
60 Pages 520-521 
61 Except the peculiar case of inferior goods, where demand is more a function of income than 
price; as income increases, consumption decreases. 
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chain of supply, where the "buyer" of the goods is actually owned or at least 
controlled by the "seller" , which will be the case at the level of entry into the 
market. A s Scherer and Ross say: 
"When monopsony and monopoly stages are integrated 
vertically, decisions regarding how much of an input to be used 
can be guided by the actual marginal cost of the input, rather 
than by bargaining strategems or by the monopsonist's concern 
for restraining the volume of its purchases to avoid driving up 
the supplier's price . Consequently, vertical integration facilitates 
arriving at the input choice that extracts maximum profits from 
whatever monopoly power exists at either stage - that is, the 
choice consistent with joint profit maximisation under 
unintegrated bilateral monopoly.... For the ultimate consumer, 
vertically integrated monopoly is less satisfactory than 
competitive behaviour at a// stages." 62 
They go on to acknowledge this is an improvement over the situation which 
arises with imperfect bargaining or price leadership, bu t, again, the present point 
of comparison is with a competitive market; where more than one importer can 
source products from more than one supplier; the vertically integrated monopoly 
is a less satisfactory situation for consumers. Indeed, as they say: 
"Our analysis reveals that under plausible circumstances, 
vertical integration downstream by an input monopolist can lead 
to enhanced monopoly power and price increases. The 
implications for economic efficiency are even more complex. 
Integration increases the efficiency of downstream input 
choices. On the other hand, if downstream product prices are 
raised owing to integration, output is restricted and classic 
deadweight monopoly misallocation losses occur. "63 
62 Page 52 1 
63 Page 526 
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I have been discussing the monopoly situation whereas restricting supplies of a 
particular brand is unlikely to create a monopoly on present interpretations of 
that term, given the Court's reluctance to see markets as constituted by a single 
product. However, if there is any market power, then similar consequences can 
be anticipated from vertical integration. The essential point being made is that 
the economic consequences are not as clear cut as might be implied by an 
outright ban on parallel imports, which augments any strength a vertically 
integrated exporter-importer may have. 
Given the present context of the merits of a banning of parallel importing, which 
generally sets up a single importer,64 it is interesting that Scherer and Ross should 
say: 
"Greater profit can be gained by an upstream monopolist if it 
sells to a competitive downstream sector or, failing that, 
integrates vertically to bring the downstream sector under its 
internal control."65 
The appointment of a single importer thus seems counter intuitive, given that 
selling into a competitive market66 generates more profit for the right holder. 
E Vertical Restraints 
Any adverse consequences on consumers arising from such vertical integration 
are compounded when the consequences arising from vertical restraints are 
factored in. The two most common vertical restraints are resale price 
maintenance, which is not necessarily a component in the present context, and the 
64 Not always the case however; IBM has authorised six resellers to import and market IBM 
computers into New Zealand. 
65 Page 541 
66 That is, to a number of importers who then compete amongst each other to resell; a business 
model used by IBM, for example, which has six resellers in New Zealand. That must go 
a long way towards preventing any of the harm which might arise from banning parallel 
importing. 
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grant of an exclusive territory, which is an inevitable consequence of banning 
parallel imports. Other potential restraints are where a right holder requires the 
importer to deal only in products from the right holder (exclusive dealing) or 
requires it to take other products from within its range (bundling). 
Quite clearly, a vertically integrated firm has formidable power to restrain the 
conduct of the downstream seller (i.e. the importer), by dictating the terms upon 
which it must buy and then resell the product but vertical integration is not 
necessary to the grant of an exclusive territory. 
Interestingly, Scherer and Ross describe the legal response in the United States as 
"tumultuous"; and at the same time there 
" ... have been sharply conflicting interpretations of the economic 
motivations for, and consequences of, vertical restraints ... 
[F]ew questions in the field of industrial organisation economics 
have been debated more heatedly.67 
The underlying motivation behind vertical restraints is to make the downstream 
sector less competitive by the creation of areas of monopolistic power or by 
increasing the margin between upstream prices and the price at which goods are 
resold. Again, there is no unequivocal rule that vertical restraints are "good" or 
"bad"; they do not necessarily benefit nor harm consumers. 
One economic justification for resale price maintenance, for example, is that there 
may be a retail market for goods which is so competitive that retailers have no 
margins from which to fund customer service, maintain desired levels of 
inventory to the point that the upstream supplier's profits suffer. In such 
circumstances, the supplier may stipulate that the retailer must resell at a 
particular price or higher; the trade-off being that consumers get more services 
67 Page 541 
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for the higher price
68
. Valuation can never be precise, but if the services do not 
fully justify the increased price, welfare is transferred to the producer and if there 
is a sufficiently large disparity in value, it will lead to decreased profitability; as 
the producer will have priced itself off the market. 
The protection from competition implied by the grant of an exclusive territory is 
said to be justified by the scope given to the importer to charge a higher margin 
between purchase and sale prices than under unrestricted competition, 
encouraging increased services provided by the importer/reseller and the carrying 
of larger stock-levels and attracting more able sellers. These "benefits" to 
consumers run up against the same problem which arises under vertical restraints; 
the inability to actually measure in any meaningful sense whether the higher prices 
paid are reflected in corresponding benefits. 
Bork69 quite convincingly demonstrates that a firm will not set up a vertical 
restraint for the benefit of the importer/reseller; it will be doing it for its own 
benefit. He moves from that point to claim: 
" ... since vertical restraints are not means of creating restrictions 
of output, we must assume that they are means of creating 
efficiencies ... " 
but it is not clear why there is such a rigid dichotomy of possibilities. Scherer & 
Ross geometrically illustrate that where retail prices are raised as the result of a 
vertical restraint, it is unlikely that there will be a corresponding gain to 
consumers, implying a loss in social welfare.70 
One significant argument raised to justify exclusive territories is that it eliminates 
the problem of free-riders; only those who have been authorised to sell the 
68 Despite this argument in favour of RPM, it is unlawful under s 37 Commerce Act 1986 
although s 58(7) does allow application to be made for authorisation. 
69 Bork, Robert H The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division ( 1966) 75 Yale LJ 402, 424 
70 Page 546. 
28 
product can do so therefore they will provide pre and post-sale services, free of 
the worry that they will expend effort in selling a consumer on the idea of buying 
a particular product but then have the consumer make the actual purchase from a 
discount outlet across town which makes no such investment in service, and then 
return to the first dealer for training or warranty support. 
Telser71 argues that retailers will not provide high levels of presale72 service 
without a vertical restraint and its ability to guarantee margins to retailers as an 
incentive; ultimately all suppliers would take the "no-frills" road. This is not 
borne out by experience however; there are many examples of firms selling the 
same product but differentiating themselves by price and service; cheap places 
happily co-exist alongside the not-so-cheap, and the former provide some form of 
constraint upon the latter. 
As Scherer and Ross point out73 , there are limits as the free-rider problem is far 
less likely to arise in respect to post-sales services; those who recognise the need 
for after sales support are unlikely to purchase from outlets where, because of 
price, it is unrealistic to expect in depth service. Furthermore, not all, perhaps 
not even most, consumers rely upon pre-sales services; because of previous 
experience or transparency of attributes which means the consumer can assess the 
product for him/herself. In addition, unless there are significant savings to be 
made, which implies a high value item, free-riding is not likely. 
F Rent Seeking 
Rent seeking behaviour is generally regarded as inefficient, because it does not 
lead to any increase in output, yet incurs a cost, possibly a significant one. It is 
almost inevitable in the present context; the efforts expended by those seeking to 
7 1 Telser, Lester G Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade ( 1960) 3 Journal of Law and 
Economics 86 
72 Such as advertising, high levels of inventory, returns policies , training and demonstrations . 
73 Page 551 
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maintain the ban, by lobbying governments, public justifications and court actions 
to restrain those infringing the ban are classic examples of rent seeking. Rather 
than getting on with business, being more innovative or efficient, firms are 
engaging in this territorial warfare which does no-one any good74 
G Global Perspective 
If there was a clear-cut answer to whether parallel imports was to be permitted or 
banned, a common world-wide approach might be expected. Surely the fact that 
different approaches have been taken through time and across countries to the 
legality of parallel importation for more than one hundred years by the 
Legislatures and Courts around the world demonstrates the lack of any 
unequivocal justification for their prevention.75 
Without analysing the position in any country to any depth , it is interesting to 
note that different approaches are still taken to parallel importation around the 
world. There is a trend in some Asian countries to regard it is beneficial. 
Examples are the decision of the Taiwanese Court to permit parallel importation 
of Coca Cola despite domestic trade mark registration 76 and the decision in the 
Tokyo District Court that allowing importation of genuine Parker pens promoted 
"free and fair competition"77 . Hong Kong (at least prior to the Chinese take-
74 Except perhaps those consultants and experts who participate in the fight, but even they 
could generally apply their talents towards more efficient and socially beneficial 
objectives. 
75 In England, Canada and the United States, parallel importers have had mixed fortunes. The 
situation in the United States has fluctuated so much, and is so dependant upon the 
construction placed on its own legislation, that the legal position of parallel imports in 
that country necessitates a paper in its own right. Suffice it to say that at various times 
this century, the legislation has been interpreted to both allow and exclude imports , with 
the current position favouring allowance. The Supreme Court has recently given leave 
to appeal so there may well be considerably more clarity in the near future. 
76 Noted by Ruff, page 122, who gives the citation as Coca Cola Co v Gin Yu Hsin Co Taipei 
Dist Ct, Civil Div 16 May 1991 
77 Noted by Ruff, page 124, who gives the citation as Schulyro Trading Co v KK Aki Shokai 
Tokyo Dist Ct I June 1964 (unreported, but noted in Tutroro Doi Digest of Japanese 
Court Decisions in Trademarks and Unfair Competition Cases 68 1971) 
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over) and Singapore have also long been markets for parallel importation. Ruff 
comments that 
" ... Japan makes frequent use of parallel imports to foster price 
competition within its markets. Increasingly, the impetus for 
such competition comes from U.S. pressure to boost import 
sales within Japan."78 
which is ironic given that pressure from the United States may well be behind 
bans against parallel imports in other countries, such as Brazil and New Zealand. 
Within the European Community, also, the balance has been drawn that the 
principle of freedom of movement of goods outweighs the loss of any benefits 
which might arise from the prohibition of parallel imports, although of course this 
will not apply to goods imported from outside the community. Ruff again points 
out the conflict between the promotion of trade within the Community and the 
protection against imports from non-Community countries: 
"As markets continue to globalize, these two functions of the 
EEC can be expected to grow increasingly irreconcilable."79 
but he expects that the EEC will seek reciprocal trading policies with other 
countries and sees the United States as being an aberration if it makes parallel 
importation harder. 
Imports are both necessary to New Zealand, as it lacks the resources to be fully 
self sustaining, and beneficial, as they allow it to concentrate on producing goods 
where it has a comparative advantage and trade those goods with countries 
producing goods in respect of which they have a comparative advantage. There 
appears to be a world-wide trend towards recognition of the benefits arising from 
international trade, reflected in the development of free trading areas, such as the 
78 Page 127 
79 Page 128 
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European Community, the North American Free Trade Agreement. In the Asia 
Pacific, it has been estimated that if New Zealand was to enter a free trade 
agreement with the ASEAN nations, it would gain $ I billion annually from 
abolishing tariff protection alone, with further gains to be made from removal of 
non-tariff barriers to international trade. 80 A prohibition of parallel importation 
does not prevent international trade, but it at least arguably amounts to a barrier 
and distorts the flow of benefits into New Zealand. 
H Summary 
Product differentiation is not costless. While it may be a simplification, generally 
the more investment in differentiation, the higher the cost to the consumer. At 
the same time, if that differentiation is effective, there will be a corresponding 
reluctance on the part of the consumer to substitute to another product, which 
translates into a increased willingness to pay. This increases the potential for 
price discrimination, which can be enforced by organisational structure and 
vertical restraints. 
These all provide the incentive for an importer to source otherwise than through 
the domestic channel; the less differentiated the product, the greater the 
opportunity for an importer to bring in a competing product. The issue is 
therefore to be summarised as to whether intellectual property protection is to 
extend beyond the original product (to reward the creation of that product to the 
investment in differentiation; which is essentially represented by marketing costs. 
Given this, it might be expected that those rights systems which protect the 
invention itself (such as copyright) would be more forgiving of parallel imports 
and the rights systems which are more closely aligned with marketing and unfair 
80 According to research conducted by the Centre of International Economics, Canberra, 
Australia as reported in the National Business Review 12 September I 997. 
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competition (that is, trademarks) would provide the more effective mechanism 
for preventing parallel importation. 
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V USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS TO 
PREVENT PARALLEL IMPORTING 
A Copyright Protection 
By section 14, copyright is declared to be a property right which exists in a 
number of statutorily defined works. The extensive nature of the definition of 
works will encompass the preponderance of manufactured and packaged articles, 
either by virtue of being works themselves, a three dimensional reproduction 81 of 
one or by being partially comprised by a work; such as a computer programme, 
artwork, manuals or writing on the packaging. A manufacturer of non-copyright 
works simply needs to package it or provide a manual in order to be able to use 
copyright protection to give it a competitive advantage. 
The rights attracted by a work are specified in section 16, 82 which will be 
infringed by conduct proscribed in Part II. Parallel importing has traditionally 
been regarded as a form of secondary infringement, as it does not involve the 
making of infringing copies. The parallel importation of copyright works is dealt 
with by section 12: 
"(3) An object that a person imports, or proposes to import, into 
New Zealand is an infringing copy--
8 1 Although the term of the protection is only 16 years. 
82 These rights are the exclusive right: 
"(a) To copy the work: 
(b) To issue copies of the work to the public, whether by sale or otherwise: 
(c) To perform the work in public: 
(d) To play the work in public: 
(e) To show the work in public: 
(f) To broadcast the work or include the work in a cable programme service: 
(g) To make an adaptation of the work: 
(h) To do any of the acts referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of this subsection in 
relation to an adaptation of the work: 
(i) To authorise another person to do any of the acts referred to in any of paragraphs 
(a) to (h) of this subsection." 
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(a) If, had that person made the object in New 
Zealand, that person would have infringed the 
copyright in the work in question; or 
Furthermore, section 35 deals with the issue of importation of infringing copies: 
"Copyright in a work is infringed by a person who, other than 
pursuant to a copyright licence, imports into New Zealand, 
otherwise than for that person's private and domestic use, an 
object that is, and that the person knows or has reason to 
believe is, an infringing copy of the work." 
One other feature of the legislation worth mentioning is the provision made in 
Part V for the licensing, assignment and transmission (such as upon death) of the 
copyright, which will last for up to fifty years from the author's death. This 
emphasises and reflects the proprietary nature of the right. 
The issue of whether parallel importation of genuine goods infringes copyright 
has rarely come directly before the New Zealand Courts. There have, however, 
been several successful interlocutory applications to injunct the importation of 
allegedly infringing copies83 as well as decisions from other jurisdictions. Little 
attempt has been made, at least in the Commonwealth jurisdictions, to rely upon 
competition legislation to prevent assertion of intellectual property rights84 . One 
explanation for this is the insistence upon considering the extent of power in the 
context of a "market"; current interpretations make it very unlikely that one 
product can constitute an entire market85 and have also placed a high threshold 
upon the degree of market power required before intervention will occur. 
83 There have been three such cases; Composite Developments (NZ) Ltd v Kebab Capital Ltd 
( 1996) 7 TCLR 186; the striking out application in Remington Arms Company Inc and 
Sportways Distributors v Reloaders Supplies Ltd and R D Dent (Auck land High Court, 
CP 384/95 , 20 Dec 96 per Master Gambrill) and Lyntec Holdings Ltd v Wills (High 
Court Auckland, CP 11/97, 29 Jan 97 per Robertson J). 
84 In the United States, such arguments have met with varying degrees of success. 
85 Tru Tone Ltd v Festival records Retail Marketing Ltd ( I 988) 2 NZBLC I 03, 081, upheld on 
appeal at [ 1988] 2 NZLR 352. 
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Over the years, a number of arguments have been relied upon in attempt by 
parallel importers to avoid infringement. Two in particular need consideration in 
the present context; one relating to the precise wording of the former legislation 
which has been held to raise an issue as to the maker of imported goods 
hypothesised and the other relating to the applicability of the doctrine of 
exhaustion. Each of these primary issues raises one or more subsidiary issues. 
1 What is "Copyright"? 
Copyright is declared by section 14 to be a proprietary right. An important 
statement of what this actually means can be seen in J Albert & Sons Pty Ltd v 
Fletcher Construction Ltd16, which involved a cassette tape of "Muzak"87 which 
had been made in the United States. The maker had all necessary rights to make 
and use the music recorded on the tape in that country. The defendant importer 
had obtained all licenses necessary for the broadcasting and performance of the 
contents of the tape in New Zealand. The plaintiff however had the sole and 
exclusive New Zealand right to reproduce the musical works contained on the 
tape and had authorised neither the making nor the importation of the tape. It 
alleged that the importation was an infringement of its right. 
The defendant argued that because it had the right to make an "ephemeral copy" 
under section 1988 there was necessarily an implicit right to import it. Quilliam J 
found the process of statutory interpretation "troublesorne"89 but accepted the 
plaintiffs argument. His view was that the Copyright Act 1962 created: 
" ... a separation of rights at every level from the moment of 
composition of a work. Every form of transaction with regard to 
86 [1974) 2 NZLR 107 
87 A peculiar type of music, arguably entirely lacking in taste or character, played as 
background in such places as elevators, shopping malls, supermarkets and telephone 
"hold" systems. 
88 A similar right to that granted by s 85 of the 1994 Act to broadcasters to make incidental 
copies 
89 Page 114 
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a work is a separate one, and is given separate protection, and 
is capable of being separately dealt with upon an economic 
basis." 90 
Making and importing were thus separate matters and the copyright owner would 
be entitled to deal separately with each of the rights listed previously as being 
conferred by section 16 of the present Act: 
"The result is that an author of a work may assign virtually all his 
rights in all countries or he may assign some only of his rights or 
he may assign rights of a certain kind in one kind in one country 
to a particular person and rights of the same kind in another 
country to another person and so on. The combination of ways 
in which he may assign his rights is almost endless. Similarly, a 
person holding a right from an author may himself make further 
assignments. In these ways there may be a multiplicity of rights 
all stemming from the original work but all different and all 
capable of separate assignment."91 
Quite plainly, copyright exists in order to provide a mechanism for extracting all 
economic benefit from a "work" by the copyright owner, either directly or by 
selling those rights to others, with a capacity for both vertical and horizontal 
exploitation.92 The possibility of the adverse consequences that might have were 
not a consideration His Honour saw necessary to mention, but he does confirm 
the use of a prohibition against parallel importation as setting up the mechanism 
for price discrimination and the vacuuming up of all consumer surpluses and 
transfer to the right holder; it is almost as if this is the objective of the Act. 
90 Page 114 
91 Page 111 
92 Thus for each and every country offering a similar statutory scheme (the horizontal 
dimension), each of the separate rights are capable of assignment (the vertical 
dimension). 
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2 The "Maker" Argument 
Section 10(2) Copyright Act 1962 provided for copyright to be infringed by 
importation where the making of the article imported would have been an 
infringement "if the article had been made in the place into which it was so 
imported." The United Kingdom had similar legislation, as did Canada, which 
has not yet abandoned it. 
This has been interpreted in such a way that the rights of a domestic right holder 
which has been granted that status by some foreign right holder will not be 
infringed if the foreign source decides to bring copyright goods into the country 
itself or even make them there. That instead is regarded as a derogation of grant, 
for which the foreign right holder might be answerable under contract law, but 
not copyright law. 93 
An argument developed as a result in the context of goods bought overseas from 
a source authorised by the foreign right holder as to whether the "maker" 
hypothesised by the section was the "actual maker", that is the foreign right 
holder. If so, as it could legitimately make and sell the works in New Zealand 
despite there being a domestic right holder, then importation would not be an 
infringement of copyright. 
The alternative hypothesis was that this fictional maker was anyone; could be the 
importer himself. On this basis, the legislation was seen to require consideration 
of the importer's rights to make the goods in the country; if that infringed the 
rights of the domestic right holder, then so too would importation. Obviously, 
given the exclusive nature of copyright, a parallel importer generally has no right 
to make the goods, so this interpretation effectively prevents parallel importation 
whereas the "actual maker" theory is more forgiving. 
93 Barson Computers (NZ) Ltd v John Gilbert & Co Ltd ( 1984) I TCLR 150, 159 
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On this point, there has been a divergence between the New Zealand and English 
approaches. Essentially applying Quilliam J's view of the idea of copyright, the 
New Zealand Courts rejected the "actual maker" test and considered whether the 
importer could lawfully make the goods here. As only the holder of the right to 
make copyright goods had such a right, importation was an infringement.94 
England, on the other hand, took the opposite approach and focused on the rights 
of the "actual maker" to make the goods in England; as there was such a right, 
importation was not an infringement.95 The Canadian cases 
do not really explore the meaning of the hypothetical 
manufacturing requirement in a detailed manner. However ... 
the cases tend to suggest that Canadian Courts follow a 
broader test than the actual maker theory. "96 
He identifies the New Zealand approach as being anomalous and describes our 
courts as "unrepentant"97 yet sees it as having a lot to recommend it, primarily 
because it is squarely founded upon a territorial notion of copyright, which is 
consistent with international conventions such as TRIPs. He does acknowledge 
however: 
"The approach may, however, lead to some potential danger of 
international price discrimination or market sharing; an issue 
which must be considered."98 
Notwithstanding this potential for danger, when New Zealand came to rewrite its 
copyright legislation, it confirmed the Barson Computers approach, by enacting 
the following provision: 
94 Barson Computers ( NZ) Ltd v John Gilbert & Co Ltd ( 1984) 1 TCLR 150 
95 CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Charmdale Record Distributors Ltd [ 1980] 2 All ER 807 and 
Polydor Ltd v Harlequin Record Shop [ 1980) FSR 194 
96 Rothnie, Warwick A Parallel Imports 1993 Sweet & Maxwell Australi a, pages 206-207 
97 
Page 222 
98 Page 226 
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"12(3) An object that a person imports, or proposes to import, 
into New Zealand is an infringing copy--
(a) If, had that person made the object in New 
Zealand, that person would have infringed the 
copyright in the work in question;" 
This is thus a statutory rejection of the "actual maker" theory; in assessing the 
legitimacy of the importation, the focus is on whether the importer could 
lawfully make the object in New Zealand; the existence of a competing right to 
make copies will therefore make the importation an infringement.99 
The implications of this were firmly before the Commerce Select Committee 
when considering the new legislation 100 yet it moved to confirm the Barson 
approach. The reasons for this are obviously related to the reasons for retaining 
the ban. The Department of Justice reported on that point: 
"Two general points can be made: 
(a) The effects of permitting parallel importing would vary 
across products as the effects would be influenced by 
market conditions which are continually changing; and 
(b} Inquiry and research cannot therefore predict the precise 
effects that parallel importing may have on particular 
products. In that sense it will never be possible to make 
a clear case for or against parallel importing." 101 
Despite this and despite an acknowledgement that abandoning the ban and 
allowing the discipline of competition would "seem to be consistent with current 
99 As has been noted , the Australian legislation is to similar effect. England has not taken the 
same approach; s 27(2) Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 remains in the form as 
in their 1956 Act, except that protection has been extended to exclusive licensees , so that 
there is statutory protection available to such an assignee against imports directly from 
the copyright owner. This effectively over-rules the decision in CBS UK Ltd v 
Charmdale Record Distributors Ltd. 
100 The Chairman specifically requested one submitter, R S Chambers QC to report on the legal 
implications of the wording of the section. 
10 1 Department of Justice Departmental Report on Copyright Bill to Commerce Select 
Com mi ttce 3 November 1994, page 40 
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economic policies in New Zealand" and the inconclusive nature of studies 
commissioned, the present legislation seems to have been strongly influenced by 
the views of Prichard J in Barson Computers; indeed, The Department of Justice 
noted the expectation that most submitters expected the law to remain as stated 
in that case. 
In my view, two factors were vital in swaying the Government towards retention 
of that approach: 
• The majority of the submitters represented the owners of intellectual property 
rights and had a natural interest in extracting maximum protection from the 
legislation. Balanced against this unity were a few individual consumers and 
dealers who saw benefits in removing the ban. It was not merely a matter of 
majority desire but also those calling for the ban had economic and political 
power; 
• There is a reference in the report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
report that there could be serious consequences to New Zealand's trade 
relations with the United States, immediately followed by the following: 
"On further reconsideration of the issue, the Government 
favoured the retention of the ban on parallel imports; ... " 
This emphasises the foundation of the decision being a political one. Now it 
seems to have been accepted without question in Composite Developments (NZ) 
Ltd v Kebab Capital Ltd102 that if the skis in question had been new, there would 
undoubtedly have been an infringement, given the wording of sees 12 and 35. 
In that decision, without any discussion , Salmon J accepted that section 12 
arguably did apply to importation of second hand skis and, with respect, that 
does seem entirely in accord with the analysis provided by Quilliam J, which 
recognised a complete separation of rights between a copyright holder in New 
102 
( 1996) 7 TCLR 186 
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Zealand and the holder of the equivalent rights in other countries; the United 
States in this instance. If goods are brought into New Zealand by someone who 
has no right to make them here, there is no foundation in the legislation for any 
distinction between new and second-hand goods. 
3 Functional Objects Argument 
If the importer can point to a right to make objects, it then has not infringed 
copyright by importation. One possibility for a parallel importer is to rely upon 
an argument that has been raised in England that the rights of those who create 
purely functional objects are curtailed by a wider public interest, based upon the 
fact that copyright gives a monopoly right 103 to works, a matter which gave rise 
to objection in Dennison Manufacturing Co v Alfred Holt & Co Ltd10-1 where 
price labelling tags had been imported, allegedly in contravention of the plaintiffs 
copyright in drawings of the tags. The defendant argued that a copyright did not, 
or at least should not, give rise to "a monopoly in a functional manufactured 
product which is not susceptible of patent or registered design protection." 105 
This was founded upon British Leyland Motor Co Ltd v Armstrong Patents1°6 
which created an exception for spare parts from copyright infringement. In that 
case, the facts are evocatively summarised by Lord Templeman 107 
"SL manufacture the Marina car. The component parts ... 
include two lengths of exhaust pipe . . . The exhaust pipes need 
replacement at intervals which vary from six months to two 
years. Armstrong manufacture replacement exhaust pipes for 
103 There appears to be ready acknowledgement by Judges that intellectual property rights do 
create monopoly interests but only in the sense of the exclusivity of particular rights, not 
necessarily in the sense of a monopoly in the marketplace so as to attract the application 
of competition legislation. 
104 (1987) 10 IPR 612 
105 Page 619 
106 [1986] 2 WLR 400; (1986) 6 IPR 102 (HL). 
107 
Pages 628-9 
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the Marina and in order to do so copy the shape and 
dimensions of the original.. BL claim that the tentacles of 
copyright have now reached out to prevent Armstrong from 
manufacturing exhaust pipes for the Marina unless Armstrong 
pay such royalty as BL think fit to require ... If [BL are correct] it 
follows that any motorist who drives a BL car must buy his spare 
parts from BL at the price fixed by BL or bear the burden of a 
royalty payable to BL for the privilege of buying his spare parts 
from some body else. The purchaser of a BL car sells his soul 
to the company store." 
In that case, it was specifically held that there was no general exemption from 
copyright protection on the basis of the goods being purely functional and non-
artistic; insofar as such goods are the three-dimensional representation of 
drawings in which copyright subsists, then the goods so produced will be 
protected on the basis that their copying would be an indirect copying of the 
drawings. 
Lord Templeman 1°8, found, unsatisfactory as it was, that British Leyland did have 
copyright protection and 
"we must take copyright law as we find it" 109 
Lord Bridge, although finding infringement, did acknowledge the unsatisfactory 
state of copyright law because, first, copyright protection virtually gave the 
. h h ' · 110 "patent monopoly" wit out t e stnctures consequent upon patent protect10n 
and, second, he saw it as "irrational" that conversion damages be available for the 
designer of industrial products, when the design contribution is only a "modest 
fraction of the value of the product". 111 
108 with whom Lords Scarman and Edmund-Davies concurred 
109 Page 639, quoting Lord Hai Isham in L B (Plastics) Ltd v Swish Products Ltd [ 1979] RPC 
551,631 
11 0 and without the implied licence to sell implicit in sale of a patent item. 
111 Page 623 
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Lord Griffith alone held that the copyright protection against reproduction by 
indirect copying did not extend to protect mechanical drawings or blueprints of 
purely functional objects, so found no infringement as Armstrong had not only 
not copied these drawings, it had not even seen them. Indeed, he saw it as 
improbable that a manufacturer would exploit copyright by restricting supplies or 
increasing the price of spare parts, because that would have an effect on its ability 
to sell the goods to which they were to be fixed. 112 Any such abuse would need 
correction by Parliament. 
The difficulty of course with his approach is that the legislative language does not 
allow for a distinction between functional and "artistic" objects 113 and he did 
recognise the importance of maintaining protection against the reproduction m 
three dimensional form of drawings which did have artistic merit or value' 14• 
In reaching the decision that there was no copyright protection, His Lordship saw 
it as relevant that British Leyland had already enjoyed the "primary benefit"' 15 
protected by the copyright and that it was inconsistent to sell cars, thereby 
creating the right to repair, and to at the same time restrain the free exercise of 
such rights; 11 [t]he law does not countenance such inconsistencies. 11116 
The basis then of the House of Lords decision was discretionary; it found that 
British Leyland was entitled to copyright protection but that entitlement 
conflicted with the right of the purchasers to repair the vehicles; exercise of the 
copyright protection would be in derogation of the rights granted as part of the 
sale. 
112 He said, at page 655, he had "misgivings" about the spare parts exception and that he would 
have had "the greatest difficulty in refusing Lo enforce that [i.e. copyright] protection 
because it might ... make it more difficult or expensive for the owner of a machine to 
obtain a spare part." The monopolistic right created by the fact of copyright protection 
necessarily caused some interference with the rights of others. 
113 Unless there is an equating of "functional" objects with items which are not original, but 
there seems little justification for that approach either. 
114 Page 654 
11 5 Page 627 
116 Page 627 
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With respect, this principle i~ vulnerable to becoming inapplicable whenever there 
is some separation in ownership between the copyright drawings and the three 
dimensional reproduction; if British Leyland had not also owned copyright in the 
drawings, there would be no derogation from grant if the copyright holder was to 
, · h 117 assert its ng ts. 
In any event, in Dennison His Honour held that there was no factual basis for any 
similarity between that case and Armstrong and that the issue had already been 
decided in New Zealand against applicability of this spare parts exception, in 
Wham-0 Manufacturing Co v Lincoln Industries Ltd11 8 . and Mono Pumps (NZ) 
Ltd v Karinya Industries Ltd119 on the basis of there being substantial differences 
in the relevant legislation between the two countries. 
In an important decision, the Privy Council has recently limited the scope of the 
Armstrong decision. In Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Green Cartridge Co (Hong 
Kong) Ltd120 which involved the making of photocopy cartridges. 121 Lord 
Hoffman, delivering the decision of the Judicial Committee, saw Armstrong as an 
expression of: 
over-riding public policy, namely the need to prevent a 
manufacturer from using copyright ... in order to control the 
after-market in spare parts. This appears clearly from the 
emphasis on the need for an 'unrestricted market' as opposed 
11 7 
This vulnerability seems to be implicitly acknowledged by His Lordship, when he goes on to 
emphasises the retention of copyright in the drawing of the exhaust pipe fitted to the car, 
after sale of the car itself. 
11 8 
[ 1984] I NZLR 641; ( 1984) 3 IPR I 15 . It should be noted that this policy argument was not 
before the Court of Appeal in Wham-0 and it is difficult to read any view as being 
expressed by the Court on this point, given that its decision was founded on the finding 
that there was sufficient originality in the Frisbee to merit protection; the rings placed by 
the plaintiffs can be seen as "capricious" and so depriving the Frisbees of a completely 
utilitarian or functional quality. 
11 9 (1986) 7 IPR 25 
120 
[ 1997] 3 WLR 13 , on appeal from Hong Kong. 
121 Owners of Canon photocopiers and laser printers, instead of replenishing toner supplies 
periodically, arc required to replace "cartridges" which contain toner, a carona wire, a 
drum and scraping device to stop build ups on the drum. The defendant made cartridges 
and attempted to sell them in competition with the Canon product. 
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to the right of the manufacturer to 'use his copyright in such a 
way as to maintain a monopoly in the supply of spare parts"o122 • 
This clear acknowledgement of monopoly rights without apparent concern is 
almost frightening in its disregard of the benefits of free markets and the potential 
evils of monopolies. His Lordship explained Armstrong as being based on an 
analogy with the kinds of repairs an ordinary man who bought the items could do 
himself and on an assumption that the exercise of market power operates against 
consumers 123 • 
With respect, such an assumption seems equally valid as an assumption that 
market power operates for consumers, implicit in His Lordship's focus on the 
need to establish anticompetitive behaviour, particularly as those holding market 
power will act in their own interests to the degree that market power allows them 
to. Consumer benefit is a possible by-product, not an essential outcome. 
4 Exhaustion 
The adverse impact on consumers of a ban upon parallel imports came quite 
plainly before the court in Time-Life International (Nederlands) BV v Interstate 
Parcel Express Co Pty Ltd12 -1 where the defendant bookstores, concerned at the 
local wholesale price of $AI0.17 of certain Time-Life books against a United 
States retail price of $US8.95, did a deal with an American wholesaler (which 
had bought from the Plaintiffs American distributor) which allowed the books to 
be sold at a retail price of $A8.95. A feature here was the fact that the importer 
seems to have been unable to acquire the plaintiffs books through the Australian 
122 Page 19 
123 Features which were not so clearly present in the instant case, in hi s view. 
124( 1976) 12 ALR I ; on appeal to High Court Interstate Parcel Express Co Pty Ltd v Time-Life 
International ( Nederlands) BV & A nor ( 1977) 15 ALR 353 
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distributor, yet the plaintiff saw fit to advise the importer of the infringement of 
copyright and require it to stop. 125 
Bowen CJ, at first instance, had little difficulty in finding copyright prima facie 
infringed. The plaintiff had the statutory exclusive right of publication in 
Australia and was infringed by importation whenever the importer or a seller 
within Australia
126 
knew that if he made the item in Australia, there would be an 
· f · 127 m nngement. 
Much was made by the defendant of American case law which had held it 
unlawful on the part of an American publisher to try to impose territorial or 
customer restrictions upon resale upon the buyers from it of books, 128 on the 
basis that this action was an attempt to impose such a restriction. For this 
reason, Time Inc withdrew but that did not prevent Time-Life, as exclusive 
licensee, from continuing with the proceeding. Thus, for technical reasons, the 
issue of the legitimacy of vertical restrictions was not before the Court. 
One argument raised was that the sale without restriction upon export in America 
was some form of licence to import the goods in Australia, despite the fact that 
the books had actually been bought from a distributor unconnected with the 
United States right holder 129 • In policy terms, if it was correct to regard the mere 
sale of an article as implicit licence to import or re-sell, Bowen CJ saw that: 
" ... not only will the procedure of granting exclusive licenses for 
particular areas of copyright be seriously undermined, but the 
national division of copyright set up under the system of 
International Copyright Conventions in so far as it provides for 
125 Interestingly, the importer's response was to place a further order with its American 
supplier. 
126 The defendant, as importer and operator of a chain of bookstores , was both. 
127 To paraphrase the combined effect of sees 31( I), 37 and 38 
128 United States v Arnold, Sch1Vin11 & Co 388 US 365 ( 1967) was cited as the leading 
authority. 
129 Really no more than a variation on arguments rel ated to exhaustion. 
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partial assignments and exclusive licences, both vertical and 
horizontal, would be to a significant degree be subverted." 130 
The importer then argued that the simple sale by the copyright owner to the trade 
without restriction necessarily imported a licence to deal with the books in any 
way the buyer saw fit, known in the European context as the doctrine of 
exhaustion. Thus the imposition of restrictions by way of copyright was a breach 
of the Australian equivalent of the section 14 Sale of Goods Act 1908 "right to 
sell" condition and warranty of quiet enjoyment. 
The objection to this was that the buyer would still be subject to all laws of the 
country of purchase and of any country to which the goods may be taken, and no 
seller could, in effect, authorise a buyer to disregard those laws, including the 
copyright laws. This was addressed by Gibbs J in the High Court: 
"To warrant that the buyer shall have quiet possession of what 
he buys is not to warrant that the owner of the copyright 
consents to the importation of the purchased books into 
Australia and their sale there after importation, or to warrant that 
the buyer may import the books into Australia and resell them 
without the consent which [sees 37 and 38] require ... 
"The 'licence of the owner of the copyright' ... means the 
consent of the owner to the importation of the articles into 
Australia for the purposes of reselling them .. . and such a 
licence cannot ... be inferred from the mere fact that the owner 
of the copyright has sold the goods without any express 
restriction upon their subsequent disposal. 13 1 
"The sale of an article confers on the buyer all the rights of 
ownership including the right to use the article, but it seems a 
130 Page 13 
13 1 Page 361 . To hold otherwise would limit the operation of s 37 to pirate copies or copies sold 
subject to some express restriction. 
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mis-use of words to say that a person who sells an article 
consents to it being used in any way the buyer wishes." 132 
Here a distinction is being drawn between the proprietary interests of the buyer in 
the chattel constituted by the book and the continued proprietary interest of the 
copyright owner in its contents. Just as the book owner has a limited right to 
copy and sell those copies, so too is its right of sale restricted by this copyright 
interest. Thus His Honour continues: 
"The copyright in the literary work of course remains with the 
copyright owner; the buyer has bought no part of it and remains 
as he was before his purchase, unable lawfully to enjoy any of 
those exclusive rights, reproduction, adaptation or the like, 
which ownership of the copyright preserves exclusively for the 
copyright owner. 133 
Gibbs J did however say: 
"In some circumstances when the owner of copyright sells a 
book his consent to a particular use may be implied. For 
example if the owner of copyright sold in America a commercial 
quantity of books for delivery to a buyer in Australia, whom he 
knew to be a bookseller, his consent to the importation of those 
books into Australia and their sale their might well be implied." 134 
Here of course, the books had not been purchased from the copyright owner, and 
the wholesaler had no authority to give consent on its behalf. This possibility 
came before the Court in Ozi-Soft Pty v Wong 135, where computer disks 
containing software were purchased in various overseas countries from the 
copyright owner and without any restriction upon resale before being impo1ted 
132 Page 359 
133 Page 366 
134 Page 360 
135 (1988) 10IPR520 
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into Australia. Nonetheless, Enfield J reached the same conclusion that there was 
no implied licence. 
The argument concerning exhaustion was given considerable attention by 
Prichard J in Barson Computers (NZ) Ltd v John Gilbert & Co Ltd136 where he 
said: 
"It is generally true that a purchaser of articles made under 
copyright by or with the licence of the owners of the copyright, 
can make any use he likes of his purchase and will not thereby 
infringe copyright. But it is otherwise when copies are taken 
across an international frontier for purposes of trade without the 
consent of the person who owns the copyright in the country of 
importation. This principle has international recognition. It is 
implemented by a system whereby each nation provides in its 
own legislation that such importation is a separate species of 
secondary infringement. 
"The object is to protect the interests of persons who own 
copyright in the country of importation. If, for example, the 
copyright owner licenses the making of copies of the original 
work in a foreign country and has no protection against 
importation of those copies into other countries where he owns 
the copyright, the value of his copyright in the country of 
importation will be diminished. Foreign made copies could then 
be imported into the country where the copyright owner is 
domiciled and where he owns the copyright - possibly flooding 
the market with copies manufactured abroad far more cheaply 
than they can be made in the "home" country. Or the foreign 
made copies may be imported into another overseas country to 
the detriment of an exclusive distributor or licensee appointed in 
that country by the copyright owner - and the ultimate detriment 
of the copyright owner. 
136 (1984) I TCLR 150, at 153 
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Obviously, his concern here is with the ability of the right holder and its duly 
appointed importer to extract maximum benefit; this ability would be destroyed 
by a "flood" of parallel importation. A similar problem would arise if the 
imported goods are actually made by the copyright owner, where it would be the 
authorised importer which would suffer most directly, by depleted royalties. As 
far as the rights of the buyer of the goods, he saw this as raising issues which lead 
to confusion of thought but referred back to the opinion of Gibbs J in Time-Life: 
" ... the judgment is of value in that it elucidates the point that the 
title acquired by the purchaser of a chattel, while entitling him to 
make such use of the chattel as he thinks fit, does not enable 
him to use the chattel in a way which infringes any copyright 
owned by the vendor. That is because although transferring full 
and unrestricted rights of chattel ownership to the purchaser, 
the vendor still retains his copyright." 137 
Thus, it is clear that the territorial nature of copyright protection and 
remuneration of the copyright holder are the paramount concerns to be addressed 
under copyright legislation. 
5 Abuse of Market/Monopoly Power 
The question of the general impact of copyright on the market-place received 
some attention in the High Court of Australia decision in the Time-Life case, 
where Stephen J said: 
"This conclusion [that the importation infringed copyright] means 
that what the appellant saw as a means, in appropriate 
circumstances, of selling in Australia books published abroad at 
much lower prices than are presently available through 
overseas' publishers Australian distributors is foreclosed to it. 
137 Page 155 
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The high cost in Australia of imported books relative to prices in 
their country of publication and the reasons for it are discussed 
by Sir Richard Eggleston in Re Books138• It is neither a novel nor 
a local phenomenon 139 • •• and is directly related to the operation 
of sections 37 and 38 of the Copyright Act and its overseas 
equivalents ... 
"There is, then, no novelty in the view that indirect infringement 
of copyright may result from the importation of material which 
until imported infringed no copyright ... and indeed may have 
originated with the plaintiff copyright owner. Any undesirable 
economic or cultural effects which some may discern as flowing 
from this aspect of copyright protection are a matter for the 
legislature 140 • 141 
Murphy J was obviously more inclined to the view that the Court did have power 
to deal with undesirable economic effects. He found an infringement but noted 
that the granting of relief was "discretionary" 142 and saw it as important to 
consider the possible effect of the Trade Practices Act 1974 on the acti vities of 
the plaintiff in seeking a restraint of the importation by the defendant. In his 
view, if the plaintiff was to succeed in stopping the importation: 
" ... this will deter others, and result in Time Inc ... monopolising 
part of the commerce between the United States and Australia. 
The evidence suggests that Time-Life lnternational 's 
enforcement of its copyright may breach the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Com). "143 
138 
( 1970) FLR 256 
139 Making reference to Re Associated Booksellers of New Zealand [ 1962) NZLR 1057 and 
Lahore and Griffiths Copyright and the Arts in Australia ( 1974) for the Canadi an 
pos ition. 
140 A matter which, as will be seen, has been taken up by the Australian Government. 
14 1 Pages 369-370 
142 Page 373 
143 Page 373. He referred specifica ll y to s 46( I) which, a lthough not of ident ica l effect, is the 
functional equi va lent of s 36 Commerce Act 1986 and also the prohibition of resa le price 
mai ntenance. 
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Although he saw the evidence as "scanty", His Honour saw it as suggestive that 
the Australian public would suffer if the plaintiff was to succeed, because the 
copyright was being used to "manipulate" the Australian market through the 
plaintiff controlling the outlets and so allowing for a virtual doubling of the price 
and a delay in access to publications freely available in the United States. It is 
interesting that such conduct is generally seen as characteristic of, and therefor to 
some extent probative of, a monopolist. A finn exposed to genuine competition 
simply could not afford to indulge in such conduct. 
Returning to Murphy J, he said: 
"Once the facts of a case disclose the reasonable possibility of 
a serious breach of the Trade Practices Act or injury to the 
public interest by a party, the court can and should require the 
party to negate this before exercising discretion in its favour. "144 
Essentially, he saw this as an application of the equitable "clean hands" doctrine 
and referred to American authority 145 but as the matter had not been raised at the 
trial and given the limitations upon appellate courts to hear matters de novo did 
not seek to exercise any discretion against enforcing the plaintiffs rights. 
Enfield J in Ozi-Soft Pty v Wong could see no room for the application of the 
trade practices legislation nor any grave injury to the public arising from the 
importer being restrained. He did however echo the comments of Murphy J in 
the Time-Life case by saying: 
"It may be that some other mechanism needs to be developed 
to resolve these issues, because the interests of the Australian 
people in having free access to literary, musical and artistic 
works, even computer video entertainment, are adversely 
144 Page 375 
145 Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co v Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co ( I 945) 
324 US 806 where the Supreme Court saw the fraudulent use by the plaintiff of patent 
rights as disentitling it from relief. 
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affected if oppressive restrictions on importation and sale may 
be imposed by copyright owners who are not themselves 
importing or intending to import the works in question. 146 
The Australian Government took heed of comments like this, and initiated an 
investigation by its Price Surveillance Authority, which found widespread 
inefficiencies m the book trade and that Australians were the victims of 
international price discrimination. Notwithstanding criticisms of its methodology 
and assumptions
147 
the Australian Copyright Act was amended to allow parallel 
importation of books, but only in circumstances where books have been 
published overseas but do not arrive on the Australian market within a particular 
time at reasonable prices and quantity levels. 
Despite further reports by the Price Surveillance Authority finding similar results 
in the markets for musical recordings and computer software, there has been no 
move to amend the legislation further. 
146 Page 525 
147 Rothnie, Chapter I 0 
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B Trade Mark Protection 
1 Justification 
Trademarks are regarded as providing "bifurcated" 148 protection to the consumer 
and to the trademark holder. In an often cited article, Landes & Posner 149 point 
out the benefit to the consumer is that trademarks reduce search costs and 
provide some guarantees of quality or at least consistency. This is because the 
firm's incentive to invest in the creation and maintenance of a strong mark 
depends upon consistent quality; a consumer who finds that goods bearing the 
same trade mark vary in quality will be unlikely to see the mark as assisting in the 
decision to repeat a purchase. Thus consumer confusion is reduced. 
The learned authors acknowledge that arguments are raised (as have been earlier 
in this paper) that 
by fostering product differentiation, trademarks may create 
deadweight costs [because] it induces the owner to spend 
money on creating, through advertising and promotion, a 
spurious image of high quality that enables monopoly rents to 
be obtained by deflecting consumers from lower-price 
substitutes of equal or even higher quality. 150 
Furthermore, as the argument goes 
" ... the ability of name branded goods to command higher prices 
than generic goods has seemed ... an example of the power of 
brand advertising to bamboozle the public and thereby promote 
148 Ruff, page 129 
149 Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective ( 1987) 
30 Journal of Law & Economics 265 
150 Page 274 
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monopoly .... [Even if] no monopoly profits are created, 
consumers pay higher prices, and resources may be wasted in 
a sterile competition." 151 
Their answer is that this "hostile view" of brand advertising has been rejected by 
economists, because even where goods have the same chemical formula. the 
trade mark is a form of guarantee that the formula has been adhered to and 
allows economising on a real cost because less time is spent on searching for the 
product actually wanted. 
Even if this is accepted, and, with respect, there is room to be sceptical 152, the 
justification breaks down when it comes to importation of goods from a foreign 
firm which owns a trade mark rather than buying directly from whichever 
domestic firm has been authorised to apply that trade mark, particularly if those 
goods are identical to the goods obtainable overseas. 
Setting aside this argument over whether the trade mark is for consumer 
protection, 153 the reason a manufacturer will use one is to differentiate its 
products from other producers of similar products. In the present context my 
concern is the degree of control a trade mark gives its owner once the goods are 
sold, in particular, whether it gives territorial control, so that trade marks can be 
used to enforce a policy of price discrimination. Given the ease with which a 
trade marked good can qualify for copyright protection and the strength of that 
151 Page 274 
152 Ruff (at pages 138-139), for example, in the United States context argues convincingly that 
elimination of consumer confusion has not driven the decisions in which Courts have 
prevented parallel importation. He suggests that any potential for consumer confusion 
could easily be resolved by product labelling laws requiring information to be given as to 
origin and warranty, as seems to be the case in Mexico, where importers are required to 
identify themselves on products brought into the country. Furthermore, actual or likely 
consumer deception is addressed by other legislation such as New Zealand's Fair 
Trading Act. This allows targetted protection, without the costs associated with an 
outright ban. 
153 Until approximately the mid 18th century, it is likely that a trade mark predominately served 
the purpose of distinguishing one trader's goods from those of another; a function made 
necessary by the widespread illiteracy, a condition which was still a factor in the passing 
of case of William Edge & Sons Ltd v William Niccolls & Sons Ltd [ 1911] AC 693. 
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protection against parallel importation, however, the use of trade marks to 
prevent parallel importation is of much lesser importance. 154 
2 Legislation 
The possibility of using a trade mark to prevent unauthorised imports arises out 
of the exclusive right given by section 8 to a registered proprietor of a trade mark 
in respect of any specified goods and services to use the trade mark in relation to 
those goods. This right is infringed if anyone other than the registered proprietor 
or user: 
... uses in the course of trade--
(a) A sign identical with it in relation to any goods or 
services in respect of which the trade mark is registered; 
or 
(b) A sign identical with it in relation to any goods or 
services that are similar to any goods or services in 
respect of which the trade marks registered, if such use 
would be likely to deceive or cause confusion; or 
(c) A sign similar to it in relation to any goods or services 
that are identical with or similar to any goods or services 
in respect of which the trade mark is registered, if such 
use would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, --
and in such manner as to render the use of the sign likely to be 
taken--
( d) As being use as a trade mark; ... 155 
The starting point is thus a New Zealand registered user or proprietor of a 
particular trade mark. As the argument goes, when goods bearing this same 
trade mark are imported and put up for sale by anyone other than the registered 
154 RA Bailey Ltd v Boccaccio Pty Ltd ( 1986) 4 NSWLR 70 I illustrates this ; the trade mark 
was ineffective to prevent importation but the label was held to be copyright and 
thererorc able to be used to prevent parallel importation. 
155 S 8( JA) Trade Marks Act 1953 
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right holder, that constitutes an infringing "use" of the trade mark. This will be 
so even where the trade mark on the allegedly infringing goods was applied 
validly by the foreign source, which might even be the assignor of the New 
Zealand right holder's rights or its parent company. The "exclusive" right 
prevents use in the country by anyone other than the domestic right holder, 
including the foreign source 156 • 
3 The "Internationalism" of a Trade Mark 
Through time, there have been different views as to whether a trade mark has 
world-wide effect given the multinational operations of many trade mark 
owners
157 
or whether it is subject to some territorial limitation 158 • 
An early but important case is Champagne Heidsieck et Cie Monopole Societe 
Anonyme v Buxton. 159 An importer bought champagne from France, imported it 
into Britain, where the trade mark proprietor, which had been granted that right 
by the French source, alleged infringement of its registered trade mark 160• 
Clausen J held the trade mark reflects the right that any person designating his 
goods by a trade mark 
"has to prevent others from selling goods which are not his 
marked with that mark in order to mislead the public and so 
156 Although if the foreign source has power to control the right holder, it would be expected to 
direct the right holder not to object if the foreign source itself infringes the right holder's 
rights . 
157 The "universal approach". Essentially what this means is that all members of a group of 
companies operating in a number of countries are treated as one "family", so that if use 
of a trade mark is allowed by one member (generally the "parent" or central repository of 
rights), then other members of the family can not complain if goods come in to their 
country. 
158 The "territorial" approach. Within the "family" structure outlined in footnote 158, each 
member has a territory, within which it has the exclusive right to use a trade mark and 
consent to use by some other member, even the parent, will not be a defence. 
159 [1930] 1 Ch 330 
160 Essentially, the label constituted the mark. As the product sold by the defendant bore 
virtually the same label , it allegedly infringed the registered proprietor's rights . 
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incidentally to injure the person who is owner of the trade 
mark" 161 • 
He also held that the parallel importing was not an infringement of the Trade 
Marks Registration Act (UK) 1875, a trade mark was not a "badge of control": 
" ... the use of a mark by the defendant which is relied on as an 
infringement must be a use upon goods which are not the 
genuine goods, i.e. those upon which the plaintiff's mark is 
properly used, for anyone may use the plaintiff's marks upon the 
plaintiff's goods, since that cannot cause the deception which is 
the test of infringement." 162 
This shows an international concept of a trade mark; there was no infringement 
because the goods had been obtained from the same foreign source as the 
domestic right holder looked to as the source of its rights. 163 The genuineness of 
the goods in their country of origin was a complete defence. 
This was given an extended scope in Revlon Inc v Cripps & Lee Ltd. 16-1 Revlon 
Inc 165 owned trade marks and operated in England through subsidiary companies, 
one of which was the assignee of the relevant trade marks. The defendant 
obtained supplies of an anti-dandruff Revlon shampoo from the US, which 
Revlon did not market in the UK, and started selling it there. The Court found a 
prima facie infringement but the importer could rely on a statutory defence, 
which is available whenever the domestic proprietor either applies the trade mark 
. 1· . h d 166 A d' R h . 167 or consents to its app 1cat1on to t e goo s. ccor mg to ot me: 
161 Citing Farina v Silverlock (1856) 6 De G.M & G 214,217; 43 ER 1214 at 1216 
162 Champagne H eidsieck case at page 341 
163 The same general result was reached in the Bailey case although His Honour made no 
specific finding in respect of the defence submission that it was unrealistic to split a 
world-wide market and trade mark into national compartments. 
164 
[ 1980) FSR 85 
165 a United States corporation 
166 By way of reminder, the particular trade mark was applied to the imported goods by the US 
parent, Revlon Inc 
167 Warwick A Rothnie Parallel Imports 1993 Sweet & Maxwell Australia 
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"Both judgments stressed the role of trade marks in indicating 
source and each was clearly troubled by the thought that 
Revlon Inc could avoid Champagne Heidsieck by the simple 
expedient of transferring its rights to a subsidiary. "168 
Buckley LJ held that the function of the trade mark in such circumstances was 
not to denote a particular part of the group as the source, but instead to denote 
goods coming from the group as a whole 169 : 
"The exploitation of the mark and of the goods to which it relates 
is a world-wide exercise in which all the component companies 
of the Group who deal in these particular products are 
engaged ... "170 
Rothnie sees the lack of autonomy by the subsidiaries and their lack of individual 
identity as being critical to this finding: 
" ... it would seem that the trade source indicated when a member 
of a corporate group uses a trade mark is not the particular 
person entered on the register, but each and every member of 
the corporate group. That broad proposition is ... based on a 
broader 'economic', rather than a strictly legal, view of the firm." 
171 
This lack of autonomy is one of the situations previously identified as giving rise 
to the potential for social and economic harm; the degree of vertical integration 
here allowed for a great deal of power to be exercised by Revlon Inc over its 
subsidiaries. Although this was not specifically referred to as a reason for not 
allowing trade mark protection, the decision removes the potential for that harm 
arising in the markets in which the subsidiaries operate. 
168 Rothnie, Pages 27-28 
169 The general approach of Revlon has been adopted in the New Zealand case of Tamiya 
Plastic Model Co v Toy Warehouse Ltd, noted at [ 1989] EIPR 277 
170 Revlon case, Page I 06 
171 Page 28 
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Unfortunately, his saying that the trade mark allows its owner to prevent injury to 
its reputation by misuse of the trade mark seems to have been taken as authority 
that a trade mark duplicates the passing off remedy and allows control of resale 
by claiming trademark infringement. This lead to the imports of Atari video 
games being restrained on one application by an Australian trade mark holder. 172 
When the holder sought to rely upon the same grounds against another parallel 
importer, Smithers J said: 
" ... once a manufacturer puts a trade mark on his goods and 
sends them into the course of trade on the billowing ocean of 
trade, wherever people bona fide deal with those goods under 
that name and by reference to that trade mark, not telling any 
lies or misleading anyone in any way at all, they are simply not 
infringing the trade mark. They are not 'using' the mark in the 
relevant sense." 113 
Young J in R A Bailey Ltd v Boccaccio Pty Ltd, 174 facing a similar issue on 
application by the owner of "Baileys Original Irish Cream" trade marks to stop 
importation from Holland, referred to 175 Re Powell's Trade Mark176 : 
" ... The function of a trade mark is to give an indication to the 
purchaser or possible purchaser as to the manufacture or 
quality of the goods - to give an indication to his eye of the trade 
source from which the goods come, or the trade hands through 
which they pass on their way to the market." 
On this basis, the defendant argued that the sale in Holland brought to an end the 
use of the trade mark and any subsequent sale would not be a "use" of the trade 
172 Atari Inc v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 20 
173 Atari Inc v Fairstar Electronics Pty Ltd (1982) 50 ALR 274,277 
174 (1986) 4 NSWLR 701 
175 al page 707 
176 
[ 1893] 2 Ch 388, 403-4 per Bowen LJ, approved by Viscount Maugham in Aristoc Ltd v 
Rysta Ltd [ 1945) AC 68, 89 (HL) where the emphasis was on the trade mark to denote 
source of the goods. 
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mark by the maker; in other words, the trade mark did not give its owner the 
right to control the goods once they had been sold and thereby removed from 
trade. His Honour saw no case as having suggested the Champagne Heidsieck 
decision was incorrect177 and that the importation did not infringe trade mark 
rights. 
The question of a multinational group, operating in a number of markets in which 
components had registered trade marks, came before the English Courts again in 
Colgate-Palmolive Ltd v Markwell Finance Ltd. 178 
Colgate UK was the registered user and Colgate US (the parent company) the 
registered proprietor of a number of trade marks related to Colgate brand 
toothpaste sold in the UK. Another company in the group, Colgate Brazil, was 
the registered user of the relevant trade marks in that country. The packaging in 
both countries was very similar, although there were variations in colour and, as 
might be expected, the words on the Brazilian products were largely in 
Portuguese. 
The Brazilian product was considerably cheaper than the UK range, largely 
because the former was an inferior product. The defendant imported Brazilian 
Colgate tooth-paste into the United Kingdom, circumventing a prohibition on 
export by which Colgate Brazil was bound, and it was sold through a wide range 
of UK retailers. Colgate UK alleged infringement of its trade mark and the 
importer relied on much the same grounds that the importer had in the Revlon 
case, consent by the registered owner or user to application of the mark to the 
Brazilian toothpaste. As Rothnie puts it, the importer's argument was that the 
Colgate group: 
177 distinguishing the High Court of Australia decisions in WD & HO Wills (Australia) Ltd v 
Rothmans Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 182 and Estex Clothing Manufacturers Pry Ltd v Ellis & 
Goldstein Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 254 relating to what constituted "use" of a trade mark on 
the basis that those cases were not concerned with parallel importation . 
178 [1988] RPC 283 
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"deliberately set out to adopt a uniform presentation of its 
products world-wide, clearly seeking to claim the advantages of 
an international goodwill without adequately differentiating 
products of different quality. therefore, it had adopted the world 
as its market and could not rely on trade mark or passing off 
rights to insulate national markets." 179 
At first instance, Falconer J 180 found that neither Colgate UK nor Colgate US 
(the parent company) had applied the marks and furthermore that Colgate US 
had placed restrictions on the use to which Colgate Brazil could put the marks, it 
only had the right to use them in Brazil. As for the question of consent by 
Colgate UK, it was obviously lacking. His Honour dealt very shortly with an 
allegation that Colgate US had impliedly consented; there was no basis for seeing 
any such consent, because of the export limitations and confirmed by the 
importer's subterfuge in obtaining the product. The fundamental distinction 
between Revlon and the present case was this export ban. 
On appeal, 18 1 Lloyd LJ said, in response to the importer's argument noted above: 
" ... [H]owever sensible that reply might seem in an era of 
multinational companies possessing a network of registered 
trademarks and a world-wide presentation, it does not accord 
with the present, as yet perhaps under-developed system of 
trademark protection. [Markwell's] response may well represent 
the law of the future 182 • the present reality is that each country 
grants trademark protection within its own territorial limits." 
179 Page 33 
180 Pages 316-8. This is disappointingly short, and caused by the fact that His Honour had 
treated passing off as the primary ground for relief. 
181 [1989]RPC49 
182 Brought on by the growing trend of countries to reach free trade agreements, to which the 
territorial insistence on intellectual property rights seems inimical. 
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The Brazilian trade marks simply could not be seen as having been applied by 
Colgate US and section 4(3)(a) was concerned only with dealings in UK trade 
marks, because trade marks are "territorial and national in character" .183 
This represents a clear departure from the previous cases , where the mark was an 
indication of corporate origin; all goods carrying the same mark came from the 
same source with international boundaries being irrelevant. Quality clearly played 
a part, as seen in Slade LJ's view: 
" ... a trader by applying a ... trade mark to goods and thereby 
indicating their origin gives an assurance to consumers in this 
country that the goods are of the quality which they have come 
to expect from products bearing that trade mark ... (T]here is 
nothing incongruous in holding that a ... trade mark is infringed 
in relation to goods which do not conform to an identifiable 
quality which purchasing members of the public ... ordinarily 
receive by reference to that trade mark. "184 
(a) Source Motivation 
These cases show the trend to regard the trade mark as indicating source or for 
consumer protection, as opposed to the channel through which the goods have 
got onto the market. The Australian case of Fender Australia Pty Ltd v Bevk & 
Sullivan 185 nicely illustrates a trade mark being used to protect the business 
goodwill associated with the authorised importer. 
Essentially, the defendant imported guitars, new and used , bearing Fender trade 
marks from the US and sold them in competition with the exclusively authorised 
Australian distributor, to which an assignment of trade marks had been made. 
The distributor was responsible for all marketing costs within Australia and it 
183 Rothnie, page 36 
184 Colgate Page 527. Emphasis added . 
185 (1989) 15 IPR 257 
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plainly took its responsibilities very seriously, making a considerable investment 
in promoting the product. 
The interesting feature 1s the reasoning adopted by Burchett J m finding an 
infringement: 
" ... members of ... the Australian public having an interest in 
guitars would be likely to understand the trade marks in 
question as indicating products acquired from their American 
producer, and distributed in Australia... The marks are badges 
of a commercial origin in Australia, as well as of an anterior 
source overseas. "186 
In other words, the trade mark had the dual functions of indicating the original 
source of the guitars as well as the distributor as the local source and so 
protecting that local source's (the distributor) goodwill, built up as a result of its 
marketing efforts. 
It does however seem to follow from His Honour's approach that the distributor 
will need to establish reputation , an association by the use of the trade mark back 
to the distributor. What then of those products where the purchasers neither 
know nor care who the importer is? Certainly, in light of the decisions in Tot 
Toys Ltd v Mitchell 187 and Bonz Group Ltd v Cooke 188 a defendant to an 
allegation of passing off by diversion of trade will have a defence if the "target 
market" has no demonstrable concern for obtaining goods from the plaintiff. If 
the Courts follow this path of overlapping trade mark protection and the passing 
off remedy, there does seem to be an ability to raise similar defences. 
186 Page 261 
187 [1993] I NZLR325 
188 
( l 996) 7 TCLR 206 
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VI CONCLUSIONS 
As has been seen, the New Zealand prohibition against parallel importation of 
goods which happen to be a copyright work qualifies as one of the most tightly 
constructed barriers to entry imaginable. The legislation has adopted the Court's 
unrepentant approach, so that those who import goods from an overseas 
copyright owner cannot rely on that owner's rights to make the goods as 
authorising the importation, unlike the situation in the United Kingdom and, to a 
lesser, extent Canada. In this respect, there is an alignment between Australia 
and New Zealand; the focus is on the importer's rights to make the goods. 
This is compounded by a clear rejection by New Zealand courts of any public 
policy factor justifying the suspension of copyright protection in respect of purely 
functional three dimensional representations of drawings, although arguably the 
precise issue of spare parts has not yet been squarely before the New Zealand 
Courts. 
In the rare circumstance that a good cannot be fitted within the copyright 
protection, there remains the possibility of claiming trade mark protection, where 
again there is a trend developing towards protection of the interests of individual 
right's holders and away from recognition of a single global market. 
Thus the right holder is given the legal mechanism it needs to establish a price 
discrimination scheme and an enforceable vertical restraint, which can be 
exacerbated by such matters as vertical integration and product differentiation. 
These cannot be characterised as being contrary to the social and economic 
interests of New Zealand in all circumstances but neither can they be seen as 
universally beneficial. The New Zealand Government has itself acknowledged 
the equivocal nature of the consequences of banning parallel imports yet have 
dealt with them in unequivocal terms. 
66 
Given New Zealand's reliance on imports, the major steps it has taken to free up 
its markets and the global trends towards freedom of trade, the abolition of bans 
upon parallel importation was something which could be legitimately expected 
when revising its intellectual property rules. 
Why then were these expectations confounded and the rules tightened, or at least 
given statutory approval? One reason put up at times is that it protects New 
Zealand firms against import competition, but the Government has made it 
abundantly clear that this is not one of its objectives, for example by the removal 
of tariff protection, which currently threatens the viability of the New Zealand car 
making industry. 
The answer is, in my view, to be found in New Zealand's vulnerability to foreign 
political and economic pressure; it is constrained by the threat from its trading 
partners to bow to these pressures. Any loss of efficiencies and other 
consequences arising from the protection given imports against competition from 
further imports is to be balanced against the ability to gain and retain access to 
foreign markets without trade sanctions. 
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